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O. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explore some syntactic and semantic facts about Korean 
conditionals. In Korean, conditional sentences are typica1ly associated with the verbal suffixes, 
-myen or -tamyen which are attached to the head verb in the antecedent of a conditional1 
(henceforth myen- and tamyen-conditionals, respectively). The main focus of this study will lie 
on a truth-conditional semantic account of two facts about 11!)1en- and tamyen-conditionals. 
First, unlike their English counterparts, (ta)myen-conditionals do not give any syntactic clues 
from w~h we can tell whether they have indicative or counterfactual interpretations. The two 
different interpretations solely depend on the utterance contexts. Second, tamyen-:COnditionals 
differ from myen-conditionals in that the former cannot be used when the proposition denoted 
by the antec.edent is a given fact, while the latter do not have such a constraint. 
As for the semantic framework., this paper draws to a large extent on the theories· that 
are developed by Kratzer (1980) and Heim (1992). In section 1, asyntactic analysis of 
conditionals is provided based on the framework of Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar 
(henceforth GPSG, c£ Gaz.dar, Klein, Pullum, arid Sag (1985), henceforth GKPS). In section 
2, the general semantic properties of Korean conditionals are discussed together with some 
semantic differences and similarities among the varieties of myen-conditionals. In section 3, 
based on Kratzer (1980), Heim (1992) and Roberts (1994), a unified version of the truth 
1Bak(l987) also regards -tako hamyen as an independent conditional fonn, but this 
conditional seems to be anoth~r ·instance ofthe myen-conditional. This matter will be discussed 
in section 2. · 
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conditions for indicative and counteifactual conditionals is proposed, which may be considered 
as a hybrid of Kratzer (I980) and Heim (1992). On this approach, different usages of 
conditionals marked by different morphology (e.g., Korean) or syntax (e.g., English) are 
accounted for by the assumption that they have different presuppositions. Section 4 is the 
conclusion ofthis paper, where some remaining problems are discussed. 
1. Syntax of (ta)myen-conditionals 
A myen-conditional structure in Korean consists of two clauses like those in English: the 
antecedent and consequent. Unlike in English, however, the morpheme representing a 
conditional in Korean is syntactically not an independent word. It is a suffix that is attached to 
the head verb ofthe antecedent clause. 
(I) Nayil pi-ka o-myen, sophwung-un chwiso-toyl-kesita. 
tomorrow rain-NOM come-COND picnic-FOC will-be-canceled · 
'Ifit rains tomorrow, the picnic will be canceled.' 
Another difference is that the linear order between the antecedent and consequent is fixed in 
nonnal speech. The antecedent which carries the conditional morpheme always precedes the 
consequent.2 
(2) *Sophwung-un chwiso-toy-lkesita. Nayil pi-ka o-myen 
picnic-FOC will-be-canceled tomorrow rain-NOM come-COND 
In the GPSG framework, this construction can be generated (or licensed) by using the 
following ID-rule. · · 
(3) s S[COND], H 
Here, COND is a head feature and so it percolates down to the lexical head of the antecedent 
clause by the Head, Feature Convention. The value ofCOND can be a fonn of the conditional 
morpheme: e.g., CONil;={myen, tamyen, ... }.3 This COND feature can be considered a 
semantically potent feature which contributes to the semantic interpretation of the structure in 
which it occurs (GKPS: 223-225). These semantically potent features make their contribution 
to the interpretation at the highest point ofoccurrence. 
The definition of the features in GKPS is in (4). Here, C and Co stand for a daughter 
node and a mother node respectively, in a local subtree. 
2In colloquial style, the consequent sometimes precedes the antecedent, giving rise to a so­
called afterthought expression. 
3Precisely .speaking, tamyen is a. complex. morpheme consisting of declarative s~ntence 
marker ia and conditional marker myen. This will be discussed in section 2. 
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(4) Let/be a semantical feature. Then a feature specification</. <i> is semantically potent 
on a daughter node labeled C in a local subtree t iff 
(i) <j. <i> e C, and 
(ii) it is not the case that <f, <i> e Co (GKPS:224) 
(4) states that a feature specification (the feature name/ and its value a) -is a semantically 
potent feature only ifit is realized on a daughter node but not on its mother node in a local tree. 
Under this assumption, the analysis of(l) is (5). Here p and fp stand for asentence variable 
and an NP variable, respectively. Also note that the antecedent clause is treated as a kind of 
adjunct, i.e., a functor which takes a sentence-type object as its argument and gives another 
sentence-type object as its value. 
(s) r s 
S[CONDmyen] s 
l )..p[cond(tomorrow'(come'(rain')))(p)] will'(be-canceled'(picnic')) 
I ~
S[COND myen] NP VP 
tomorrow'(come'(rain')) picnic' Afp [will'(be-canceled'( fp ))] 
~ I ~ 
ADVP S[COND myen] sopwung-un chwiso-toyl kesita 
tomorrow' (come'(rain'))) 
I ~
nayil NP VP[COND myen] 
rain' Afp[come'(rp)] 
I I 
pi-ka V[COND myen] 
Afp[come'(rp)] 
I 
o-myen 
In (5), the node where the semantic contribution of the COND feature is made is in the 
local tree indicated by (a). Here the syntactic category ofthe mother node is S, while that of the 
daughter node is S[COND myen], which is the.highest Snode ofthe antecedent clause. Hence 
the sematically potent feature [COND myen] satisfies the definition in (4): [COND myen] is 
realized on the daughter node but not on the mother node. In local tree (a), "cond" is a 
semantic representation of the COND feature. In section 3, it will be proposed how a sentence 
with the COND feature is interpreted with respect to its utterance contexts, i.e., what the truth 
conditions of c + cond(~)(w) are in terms ofHeim (1992). 
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The linear precedence between the antecedent and consequent is determined by a well­
known LP statement in Korean: X < Head (Head follows anything). That is, the syntactic head 
of a whole conditional is the consequent, and the LP statement requires that it should follow 
the antecedent. 
2. General semantic properties of (ta)myen-conditionals 
In English, subjunctive conditionals are syntactically distinguished from indicative conditionals 
in that the head verbs in antecedents of subjunctive conditionals are backshifted, while past 
forms ofauxiliaries like would, might are used in consequents. 
(6) a. IfJohn is in London, he will visit his relatives. (indicative) 
b. [To a friend who is sitting on a chair] ­
Ifyou sit there, you can see a picture on the wall. (mdicative) 
c. IfJohn were in London, he would visit his relatives. (counterfactual) 
In contrast to English, however, (ta)myen-conditionals in Korean do not display such a 
syntactic distinction. They are interpreted as having an indicative or counterfactual reading, 
depending on their utterance context. For example, myen- or tamyen-conditionals are used 
when the proposition p denoted by the antecedent is not a given fact, but compatible with the 
given context c. (7) can be uttered in a context where the fact that Mary will come is not in the 
given context, i.e., where the speaker and hearer do not know whether Mary will come or not 
(hypothetical indicative). Note that in this case, both myen- and tamyen-conditionals are 
acceptable. 
(7) 
Mary-ka 
Mary-NOM 
r-myen 
o ~ 
l-ntamyenJ 
come-COND 
l 
~ ku sosik-ul 
the news-ACC 
al swu issta. 
know-will-be-able-to 
'IfMary comes, we will be able to get the news.' 
Myen- or tamyen-conditionals are also used when the proposition p denoted by the 
antecedent is not a given fact. The proposition p denoted by the antecedent in (Sc) is a given 
fact in the context c because it is uttered in a context in which the fact that B uses AT&T is 
already known to be true to A (factual indicative). Note that in this case, (n)tamyen-conditional 
in (Sc) is awkward and marked with#. 
(8) a. A: Etten hoysa-uy cangkeli-cenhwa-lul iyonghasipni-kka? 
which company-GEN long-distance-call-ACC use-INT 
'Which company do (you) use for long-distance calls?' 
b. B: AT&T-lul iyonghapnita. 
AT&T-ACC use 
'(I) use AT&T.' 
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C. A: r-myen l 
Kulayyo, AT&T-Jul iyonghasi ~ 
L#-ntamyen 
~ 
J 
manhun 
right AT&T-ACC use-COND many 
hyeythayk-i issupnita. 
advantage-NOM exist 
'(you make the) right (choice), if(you) use AT&T, (you) have many 
advantages.' 
Myen- or tamyen-conditionals can also be used when the proposition denoted by the 
antecedent is known to be false, i.e., when the proposition p denoted by the antecedent is not 
compatible with the given context c, as shown in (9). 
(9) (in a context where the speaker knows that Mary did not come yesterday) 
r-umyen 
Mary-ka ecey oass ~ ~ te caymi-ka issessultheyntey. 
L-tamyen J 
Mary-NOM yesterday came-COND more fun-NOM exist 
'IfMary had come yesterday, (we) would have had more fun.' 
(9) is uttered when the fact that Mary came is known to be false (counterfactual subjunctive). 
In this case, both myen- and tamyen-conditionals are possible. 
From the above observations, we can say that in myen- and tamyen-conditionals, there 
is no syntactic or morphological distinction between indicative and counterfactual usages. 
However, lamJlen-conditionals differ from myen-conditionals in that tamyen-conditionals are 
possible only in hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals. We cannot use tamyen in a 
factual conditional as shown in (Sc). Some more examples that show the difference are given in 
(10)-(12). 
(10) (looking at falling rain) 
a. # Pi-ka on-tamyen, canti-ka salanal-kesita. 
rain-NOM come-COND lawn-NOM come-to-life-will 
•Ifit rains, the lawn will come to life.' 
b. Pi-ka o-myen, canti-ka salanal-kesita. 
rain-NOM come-COND lawn-NOM come-to-life-will 
•Ifit rains, the lawn will come to life.' 
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(11) (to a woman who is pregnant) 
a. # Ayki-lul nahnun-tamyen, e•-ka kippehasil-kesita. 
baby-ACC give-birth-to-COND mother-NOM be-pleased-will 
'If(you) give birth to a baby, (your) n;iother will be pleased.' 
b. Atul-ul nahnun-tamyen, emma-ka kippehasil-kesita. 
son-ACC give-birth-to-COND mother-NOM be-pleased-will 
'If (you) give birth to a son, (your) mother will be pleased.' 
c. Ayki-lul nahu-myen, emma-ka kippehasil-kesita. 
baby-ACC give-birth-to-COND mother-NOM be-pleased-will 
'When (you) give birth to a baby, (your) mother .will be pleased.' 
d. Atul-ul nahu-myen, emma-ka kippehasil-kesita. 
son-ACC give-birth-to-COND mother-NOM be-pleased-will 
'lf(you) give birth to a son, (your) mother will be pleased.' 
(12) (to a pregnant woman who already knows that she does not bear twins) 
a. Ssangtongi-lul nahnun-tamyen, emma-ka nollasil-kesita. 
twins-ACC give-birth-to-COND mother-NOM be-surprised-will 
'lf(you) gave birth to twins, (your) mother would be surprised.' 
b. Ssangtongi-lul nahu-myen, emma-ka nollasil-kesita. 
twins-ACC give-birth-to-COND mother-NOM be-surprised-will 
'If(you) gave birth to twins, (your) mother would be surprised.' 
In (10), the antecedent is true in an actual world (factual). In this case, the myen­
conditional in (IOb) is acceptable, whereas the tamyen-conditional in (IOa) is awkward. (I la) is 
also awkward since ifa woman is expecting a baby, then it is a normal course ofevents that she 
gives birth to a baby, and thus the antecedent cannot be hypothetical or counterfactual. In 
contrast, (IIb) is acceptable since bearing a baby does not necessarily mean giving birth to a 
son, and thus the antecedent can be hypothetical. (I lc,d) are both acceptable since myen­
conditionals are possible in all kinds of conditionals. On the other hand, (I2a,b) are acceptable 
since the antecedent is counterfactual. 
Then, one question that arises is what the property of the morpheme ta is that comes 
before myen and triggers the difference between myen- and tamyen-conditionals. Ta in Korean 
is a morpheme for the_ declarative sen~ence marker, which also occurs in embedded sentences. 
(13) a. Pi-ka o-ass-ta. 
rain-NOM come-PAST-DECL 
'It rained.' 
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b. Nay-ka pi-ka o-ass-ta-ko malhayssta. 
1-NOM rain-NOM come-PAST-DECL-COMP said 
'I said it rained.' 
It seems that the appearance of the declarative marker ta somehow blocks the speaker's 
commitment to the truth value of the embedded sentence when it occurs with conditional 
morpheme -myen.4 And this may be the reason why -tamyen is not used in a factual 
conditional. 
The difference can also be seen from telephone conversations. For example, when B 
hears from A that it is raining now in A's area, B can use a tamyen-conditional as well as a 
myen-conditional, even though the fact that it rains in A's area has been mentioned by A just 
before. 
(14) A: Cikum yeki pi-ka o-n-ta. 
now here rain-NOM come-PRES-DECL 
'It is raining here now.' 
B: Kulay! pi-ka on-tamyen canti-ka salanakeyssney. 
Oh! rain-NOM come-COND lawn-NOM comes-to-life-again-FUT 
'Oh! Ifit is raining (there now), the lawn will come to life again' 
In this case, a tamyen-conditional is possible because B does not need to commit himself to the 
truth value of the antecedent B just repeats or uses the assertion of A, not his own assertion. 
And this shows that tamyen-conditionals are in some sense similar to tako hamyen-conditionals 
which will be discussed below. 
According to Bak ( 1987), tako hamyen is another form that represents hypothetical or 
counterfactual conditionals. It seems to me, however, that tako hamyen conditionals are just 
another instance of myen-conditionals due to the following reasons. First, there is another 
conditional form tako hantamyen which is similar to taJw hamyen. Tako hantamyen contains 
the conditional morpheme tamyen that only occurs in hypothetical and counterfactual 
conditionals. In contrast, tako hamyen contains the conditional morpheme myen which occurs 
in all three kinds ofconditionals. Thus, we have a four part analogy in ( 15). It would be more 
natural if we can explain the relationships between them, instead of assuming that all four are 
separate morphemes. 
(15) myen: tako hamyen :: tamyen: tako hantamyen 
In tako hamyen and tako hantamyen, tako is a complex morpheme in which a declarative 
sentence marker ta and a complementizer ko are combined. It signals that the preceding 
element is an embedded clause. The verb ha (roughly 'do' in English) in such clause has 
several different lexical meanings. Among them, the most appropriate meaning in (15) is that 
ofreporting. 
4At this moment, I do not know the reason why it should be the case. 
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(16) Kim-i o-keyss-ta-ko ha-yessta. 
Kim-NOM come-will-DECL-COMP say-PAST 
'Kim said (he) would come.' 
Thus, in the following examples, (¢ tako hamyen, VJ) or (¢ tako hantamyen, vi) are 
understood to be roughly equivalent to "if the report ( or saying) that 4> is (were) admitted 
(granted), then IJI". 
(17) rha-myen 1 
Nayil pi-ka on -ta-ko ~ ~ 
lhan-tamyen J 
sophwung-un 
tomorrow rain-NOM come-DECL-COMP said-COND picnic-FOC 
chwiso-toyl-kesita. 
will-be-canceled 
'Ifthe report ( or saying) that it will rain tomorrow is (were) granted, the picnic 
will be canceled~' 
Tako hamyen- and tako hantamyen-conditionals also show the same property as myen­
and tamyen-conditionals, respectively. Tako hamyen is allowed in all three kinds of 
conditionals, but tako hantamyen is not allowed in factual conditionals. For example, when the 
speaker just heard a weather report from someone that says it will rain tomorrow, it is 
inappropriate to use tako hantamyen in (I 7), but tako hamyen can be used without any 
awkwardness. From this, we can conclude that tako hamyen and tako hantamyen are just 
other instances of myen and tamyen, respectively. In other words, tako hamyen is equivalent 
to myen when we include the meaning oftako ha into the meaning of the antecedent (nayil pi­
ka on-tako ha 'it is said that it will rain tomorrow') in that both can be used in factual 
conditionals. However, tako hamyen is also equivalent to tamyen when we consider only the 
embedded proposition without tako ha (nayil pi-ka onta 'it will rain tomorrow' in (17)) as the 
antecedent, in that the speaker does not commit himseIDherself to the truth value of the 
embedded proposition. The speaker just uses information that is reported from a third person. 
In this case, tako hamyen-conditionals can be regarded as hypothetical or counterfactual, but 
not as factual, conditionals. 
The summary of this section is as follows. (i) In Korean, the indicative or 
counterfactual conditionals are not syntactically or morphologically distinguishable; rather the 
different interpretations come solely from context. (ii) Tamyen-conditionals cannot be used 
when the proposition denoted by the antecedent is known to be true, while in myen­
conditionals, such a constraint does not exist. (iii) Tako hamyen-conditionals differ from 
tamyen-conditionals in that the former only indicates reported information without commenting 
on its truth or falsity. 
3. Truth conditional semantics of (ta)n91en-conditionals 
The purpose of this section is to explore the truth conditions of Korean myen- and tamyen­
conditionals. There have been various analyses ofEnglish conditionals within the framework of 
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truth conditional semantics, for example, Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973), Kratzer (1980, 
1989), Heim (1992), and Roberts (1994) among others. What is common among these 
analyses is the following intuitive idea. In order to determine the truth or falsity of a whole 
conditional, we need to hypothetically add a set ofworlds or situations in which the proposition 
denoted by the antecedent is true to the set ofthe worlds or situations that already exist in the 
context set. If the proposition denoted by the consequent is true in the added set ofworlds or 
situations, then the whole conditional is true. Otherwise it is false. The above authors differ 
from each other in how to constrain the set ofworlds or situations. This paper will review the 
theories proposed by Kratzer (1980) and Heim (1992), discussing why their theories are not 
directly applicable in the case of (ta)myen-conditionals. Following Roberts (1994), we will 
propose an explanation for the differences and . similarities between the two kinds of 
conditionals by means of slight modifications ofKratzer (1980) and Heim (1992). 
, 3.1. Presupposition and the difference between myen- and tamyen-conditionals 
According to Stalnaker (1979), participants in a conversation share a set ofpropositions which 
are mutually agreed upon among them. This set of propositions is called the common ground 
ofthe conversation. Based on the notion of common ground, the context set is defined as the 
set of possible worlds compatible with the common ground. Given that propositions can be 
thought as denoting sets of possible worlds, we have: context set = rl(common ground). 
Based on this notion ·ofcontext set, Stalnaker characterizes making an assertion as reducing the 
context set in a particular way. This characterization of assertion is compatible with Heirn's 
(1992) context set and her treatment of a sentence meaning as Context Change Potential 
(CCP). Heim's definitions ofthe context set and CCP will be discussed shortly. · 
As already discussed in section 2, tamyen-conditionals cannot be used when the 
proposition p denoted by the antecedent is al.re!ldy known to be true (when p is a given fact or 
true in a given context c (i.e. c £;; p)), while in myen-conditionals, such a constraint does not 
exist. In this subsection, we will address the following questions: (i) what is the difference 
between myen- and tamyen-conditionals, and (ii) how can the difference be represented in truth 
conditional semantics. 
To find an answer to the first question, let us consider the example in (Be) again which 
shows the contrast between the two conditionals. 
(8) (in a context where the fact that the hearer uses AT&T is already known to be true to A) 
C. A: r-myen 1 
Kulayyo, AT&T-lul iyonghasi 1 ~ manhun 
l#-ntamyen J 
right AT&T-ACC use-COND many 
hyeythayk-i issupnita. 
advantage-NOM exist . 
'(you make the) right (choice), if(you) use AT&T, (you) have many 
advantages.' 
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In this example, a tamyen-conditional is awkward because the fact that A uses AT&T is 
already a part ofthe A's context set. Then what is the grammatical status ofthis awkwardness? 
What is involved in the awkwardness seems to have something to do with a presupposition 
violation, Tamyen-conditionals presuppose that the proposition p denoted by the antecedent is 
not a given fact, i.e., pis not true in all the worlds ofthe context set of the interlocutors. Then, 
we can say that /amyen-conditional in (Sc) is awkward because it violates this presupposition. 
This assumption seems to be right, because the awkwardness of the sentence in (Sc) results 
from the fact that we cannot tell whether it is true or false. Note that a proposition violating an 
involved presupposition does not have a truth value (i.e., is not interpretable). 
Then how can this presuppositional constraint on tamyen-conditionals be introduced 
into truth conditional semantics? One of the most recent proposals on presupposition and its 
projection is Heim (1992), and her framework ofContext Change Semantics can accommodate 
this kind of presuppositional constraint. According to her, the meaning of a sentence is its 
Context Change Potential (CCP). A CCP is a function from contexts to contexts, and contexts 
are sets ofpossible worlds. The change effected by the CCP of a sentence consists of updating 
the information in the context with the semantic content of the sentence. The presuppositions 
ofa sentence are requirements on the context. They determine to which contexts the CCP of a 
sentence can be applied. CCP definitions of sentences consist of two parts: the first part is for 
the presuppositional conditions (called deftnedness conditions in Heim (1992)) and the second 
part is for information updating. Here the first part van be used for the presuppositional 
constraint on tamyen-conditionals. 
Heim (1992} uses two different CCP definitions shown in (18} and (19} to represent 
English indicative and counterfactual conditionals, respectively. (20) and (21) are the 
definitions of same and the Simw function, respectively, which are utilized to define (18) and 
(19). (22} is the definition ofrev(ision) function, which is utilized to define (19). 
(18) CCP for English indicative conditionals 
c+if<!>, lj/ = {w E c: Simw(c+<!>) + lj!= same} 
(19) CCP for English counterfactual conditionals 
c +if<!> would lj/ = {w E c: Sirnw(rev,(c) + <!>) + lj/ =same} 
(20) Ifc is any context, <I> any LF, 'c + <I> = same' expresses the condition that c + <I> = c. 
(21) Sirnw (p) = {w'E W: w'E p and w' resembles w no less than any other world in p} 
(22) For any context c, LF <I>: 
rev,(c}, the revision ofc for<!>, is v{X s;;; W: cs;;; X and X + <I> is defined} 
(18} states that indicative conditionals are true only in the set ofworlds whose element worlds 
belong to the hypothetical context set Simw(c + <I>) which (i) retains all the information in the 
original context set c along with that contributed by the antecedent <I> (i.e., Simw(c +<!>)is a set 
of worlds whose elements belong to (c +<!>)and resemble w most closely); and (ii) entails the 
consequent lj/ (i.e. Simw(c + <!>) plus the lj/ worlds is the same as Simw(c + <!>)). In 
counterfactual conditionals, the original context set c is not compatible with <!>'s information, 
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and tlms the whole conditionals are predicted to be vacuously true ifwe treat counterlactuals 
the same as indicatives. To avoid this problem, Heim (1992) uses the revision function in (22). 
Rev.(c) is the union of the sets of worlds X which contain the given context set c and where 
the presuppositions of+ are satisfi~. (19) says that counterlactual conditionals are true only in 
the set of worlds whose elements belong to a hypothetical context set represented by 
Sim.,(rev.(c) ++),which (i) is a set ofworlds X whose subset is the original context set c, (ii) is 
defined when . the infonnation contnbuted by the antecedent + is added to it (i.e., the 
presuppositions ofcj, are satisfied in the set of the worlds denoted by rev+<.,c)), (Iii.) entails the 
consequent IV, and (iv) whose elements resemble w most closely. 
The definitions ofCCPs in (18) and (19) may work for myen- and fan!Yen-COnditionals 
if we put a definedness condition (presuppositional constraint) on tamyen-conditionals to 
represent the difference between myen- and tamyen conditionals, and disjoin (18) and (19) to 
represent that both conditionals can be used fur either indicative.or counterfiictual conditionals 
depending on the context, as shown in (23).5 
(23) CCP for (ta)myen-conditionals (preliminary version) 
[(C + ( (j,-tamyen, IV}) is defined iffC + cj, .< C] 
Where defined, 
either (c+(+-{ta)myen, 1V))= (w E c: Sim.,(c+cl,)+1V=same} 
or (c + (cj,-(ta)myen, IV))= (w E c: Sim.,(rev+<.,c) + cj,) +IV= same} 
The definedness condition in (23) (the part within square brackets) says that tamyen­
conditionals are defined only when the modified context set c + + (the context set 
hypothetically modified by addition of the infonnation contnbuted by the antecedent) is not 
identical to the original context set c. That is, c + cl, equals c only when cj,'s infonnation is 
already a part ofthe given context c. Then, this condition amounts to saying that only tamyen­
conditionals presuppose that the antecedent cannot be a given fact, and thus can account fur 
the difference between myen- and tamyen conditionals. · 
Ifthis approach is pursued, however, a question arises about the rest of the CCP, the 
disjunct clauses. One ofthe uncontroversial claims may be that in (ta)myen-conditionals, unlike 
English, the choice between indicative and counterfuctual interpretations totally depends on the 
context. One ofthe problems fur the disjunct clauses is that they provide no way to incorporate 
this context dependency of the choice of interpretations. (23) simply states that (ta)myen­
conditionals can have indicative or counterfuctual interpretations, but states nothing about how 
a certain interpretation is determined by which contexts are picked up by the interlocutors. 
Moreover, according to (23), the same form can have two different truth conditions, and the 
conditionals seem to be ambiguous. However, it is hard to say that they ·are really ambiguous 
since their interpretations differ only depending on the context in which they are uttered. One 
way to avoid these problems would be to give only one truth condition to (ta)myen­
conditionals for both interpretations, with a devi~ by which the interpretational differences can 
'.In (23), (cj,-tamyen, IV) is an abbreviation of cond[tamyen](4'XIV). (See section 1 for the 
semantically potent feature COND and its denotation cond.) Likewise, (+-(ta)myen, IV) 
abbreviates cond[tamyen v myen](cj,)(IV)- · 
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be pragmatically (contextually) explained. This is accomplished in Krmer (1980) by the 
notions of modal base and ordering source. In the next section, those notions will be 
incorporated into the theory ofCCPs. Note that Krmer's theory alone cannot fully account for 
Korean conditionals, especially the presuppositional facts discussed in this section, because her 
theory does not have any explicit device which handles presupposition satisfaction. 
3.2. Modal base, ordering source, and interpretations of (ta)myen-conditionals. 
In Krmer (1980), the force ofmodal expressions like necessarily, possibly is not absolute, but 
is relativized to two contextually detennined sets ofworlds. One is a set ofworlds determined 
by a function called a modal base. The modal base is a function which takes a world as its 
argument and gives a set of propositions called conversational backgrounds. The choice of a 
certain conversational background is determined by the context in which an expression is 
uttered. Depending on the context, the conversational background can be realistic, epistemic, 
deontic, empty, and so on. The set ofworlds detennined by the modal base is the intersection 
ofthe set ofpropositions assigned to any world w e W by the modal base, which gives the set 
ofworlds 1"1(modal-base(w)) (or r,t{w)). The other set ofworlds is determined by a function 
called an ordering source. The ordering source function takes a world as input and gives as 
output an ordering among the worlds where a set ofpropositions g(w) are true. The worlds are 
ordered by ~w> from the world(s) most like the ideal world to those least like the ideal world. 
Among the worlds, only the world(s) most like the ideal is (are) considered to be in the domain 
ofthe explicit or implicit modal. 
As for conditionals, the modal base is (, which is a function from possible worlds to 
sets ofpropositions, such that for any worlds w, ((w) =t{w) u {p}. Here pis the proposition 
expressed by the antecedent. In this kind of approach, unlike that of Heim (1992), indicative 
and counterfactual conditionals have the same truth conditions, and different interpretations of 
the conditionals are obtained by parameterizing the modal base and ordering source. For 
example, in Kratzer ( I 980), the material implication interpretation of a human necessity 
conditional (if1fi, then necessarily vi) is obtained by a totally realistic modal base and an empty 
ordering source, while the counterfactual interpretation of the same conditional is obtained by 
an empty modal base and a totally realistic ordering source. 
Following Roberts (1994), I assume modal base (MB) and ordering source (OS) 
functions to take an ordered triple (1,c,w), where i represents a modal expression, c a context, 
w aworld, instead ofjl,lst a world argument.6 Then we may combine the MB and OS functions 
with Heim's CCPs by revising (23) into (24), with the definitions ofClosest Context (CC) in 
(25) and the ordering ~w> in (26):. 
6Roberts (1994) uses a version ofKratzer's (1989) situation semantics, and thus the triple 
consists of (1,c,s), where s stands for a situation. 
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(24) CCP fur (ta)myen-conditionals (final version) 
[(C + ( +-tan!),en, ljf}) is defined iffC + • a< C] 
Where defined, 
[c++-(ta)myen, II']= {we c: C~..i[(rev+(c) r. r.MB(1,c,w))++] + 'If =same} 
(25) Definition fur the CC (Closest Context) function 
For all sets ofworlds X, 
~w>(X) ={w: we X and fur all vie X, w ~;,.,wi vi} 
(26) Definition fur the ordering ~...wi 
For all worlds wand vie W, 
w ~...w> vi itf{p: p e OS(1,c,w) and vie p} ~ {p: p e OS(1,c,w) and w e p} 
The definedness condition in (24) is the same as that in (23). However, we do not need the 
disjunct clauses in (23) any longer due to the functions MB and OS. The choice between the 
indicative and counterfuctual interpretations solely depends on what conversational 
backgrounds are pragmatically picked up. The rev+(c) in (24) is a set ofworlds in which:all the 
presuppositions of+ are satisfied, as already mentioned in section 3.1. r.MB(1,c,w) is a set of 
worlds in which all the propositions in the MB for ~c, and w are true. Thus, the intersection of 
the two (i.e., (rev+(c) r. r.MB(~c,w)) is a set ofworlds in the MB for~ c, and win which +·s 
presuppositions are satisfied. Ifwe add +·s infonnation to this set ofworlds, we get [(rev+(c) r. 
r.MB(i,c,w)) + +1 which is a set of worlds excluding all the non.+ worlds from the set of 
worlds denoted by((rev+(c) r. r.MB(~c,w)). 
Then we need to pick out a set ofthe closest world(s) to the ideal world among the set 
ofworlds denoted by [(rev+(c) r. r.MB(1,c,w)) + +]. In order for the whole conditional to be 
true, 'If must be true in the closest world(s). The closest world(s) is (are) determined by the 
ordering with respect to the propositions picked up by OS(~c,w) as shown in (26). (26) states 
that w is closer to the ideal than any other worlds vi only when the number ofthe propositions 
which belong to OS(i,c,w) and are true in w is greater than the number of the propositions 
which belong to OS(~c,w) and are true·in vl.7 Then the value of the CC function in (25) is a 
set ofworlds whose elements belong to the set ofworlds denoted by [(rev+(c) r. r.MB(1,c,w)) 
+ +l and are closest to the ideal world. In other words, the value of CC>sc;,.,wi[(rev+(c) r. 
r.MB(~c,w)) + +1 is a set ofworld(s) closest to the ideal in the MB for~ c, and win which +'s 
7There is a problem concerning the definition of the ordering in (26). According to this 
definition, as mentioned above, we determine the closest world(s) to the ideal only by counting 
the number of the propositions which belong to the set of propositions picked up by the 
OS(1,c,w) and true in the world(s) in question. If the number of the propositions true in w is 
greater than that ofthe propositions true in vi, then w is closer to the ideal than vi. A problem 
fur this approach is pointed out in Kratzer (1989). She persuasively argues that it is hard to 
explain all the relevant phenomena ofcounterfactual conditionals ifwe just count the number 
of the true propositions without considering the contents of the propositions. I.e., not all 
propositions have equal weight. Some are important, while others are totally irrelevant. To 
avoid the problem, we may need to incorporate the notion of"lumping'' into the definition of 
the ordering in a fashion shown in Roberts (1994). 
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presuppositions are satisfied and from which all the non~ worlds are excluded. Then (24) 
amounts to saying that a whole (ta)myen-conditional .is true only when the set of world(s) 
denoted by CCoS(,o,wJ[(rev,(c) n nMB(~c,w)) + cj>] entails II', which is the correct truth 
conditions for conditionals. 
Definition (24) as it is now allows the intersection between the revision function and 
the intersection ofthe MB function to be the empty set. This seems to cause a problem since in 
this case, the C~;,,;wJ function is not defined and thus the whole CCP is not defined either. To 
solve this problem, I propose a constraint on definedness ofCCcS(,o,w) as follows: 
(27) Constraint on definedness ofCCcS(,o,w) 
For all sets ofworlds X, Xis in the domain ofC~,o,w) only ifX *- 0. 
(27) simply stipulates that the argument of the function CCcS(,o,w) must not be the empty set in 
order for the function to be defined. 
Then let us consider some examples discussed in section i. The hypothetical 
conditional in (7) has an epistemic modal base and an empty ordering source. 
(7) ( -myen 
Mary-ka o ~ ~ ku sosik-ul al swu issta. 
l-ntamyenJ 
Mary-NOM come-COND the news-ACC know-will-be-able-to 
'IfMary comes, we will be able to get the news.' 
The value ofnMB(~c,w) is a set ofworlds in which all the known propositions are true. In this 
case, there is no presupposition involved, the value of(rev,(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) is the same as 
that ofnMB(i,c,w). Thevalueof[(rev.(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) + cj>] is a set ofworlds ofall known 
propositions minus the worlds in which Mary does not come. The value ofCCcS(,o,wJ[(rev.(c) n 
nMB(i,c,w)) + cj>] is the same as that of [(rev.(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) + cj>] due to the empty 
ordering source. The empty ordering source assigns an empty set ofpropositions to all possible 
worlds, so that we cannot determine an ordering among the worlds with respect to the set of 
propositions picked up by OS(i,c,w). Hence, the value ofCCcS<,o,wi[(rev0(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) + 
cj>] is the same as that of [(rev,(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) + cj>]) in (7). (7) is true only when the 
consequent ku sosik-ul al swu issta ('we will get the news') is true in the set of worlds of 
c~,..w,[(rev,(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) + cj>]. 
The modal base of the factual myen-conditional in (Sc) has to be totally realistic to 
guarantee all the facts in w. 
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(8) (in a context where the fact that the hearer uses AT&T is already known to be true to A) 
c. A: r-myen l 
Kulayyo, AT&T-lul iyonghasi ~ 
l#-ntamyen 
~ 
J 
rnanhun 
right AT&T-ACC use-COND many 
hyeythayk-i issupnita. 
advantage-NOM exist 
'(you make the) right (choice), if(you) use AT&T, (you) have many 
advantages.' 
The :value of ..MB(i,c,w) is a set ofworlds w where some subset ofthe propositions true in w 
are all true (i.e., a set ofworlds in which some ofthe facts in ware true). The value of(rev.(c) 
r, ..MB(i,c,w)) is the set ofworlds in which the presuppositions of the antecedent AT&T-lu/ 
iyongha ('B uses AT&T') are satisfied. Since no presuppositions exist in the antecedent, the 
value of(rev,(c) r, ..MB(~c,w)) is the same as that of ..MB(i,c,w). The value of [(rev+(c) r, 
..MB(i,c,w)) + 4>] is also the same as that of (rev.(c) r, ..MB(i,c,w)), because the set of 
worlds in which the antecedent is true is already a part of the set of worlds (rev+(c) r, 
..MB(~c,w)). Here the relevant ordering source is empty. Hence C~;,c,wJ[(rev,(c) r, 
..MB(1,c,w)) + 4>] does not narrow down the set of worlds of [(rev.Cc) r, ..MB(~c,w)) + 4>] 
any further. The whole sentence is true only when the consequent manhun hyeythayk-i 
issupnita ('B has many advantages') is true in the set of worlds of CCoS(;,c,w)[(rev+(c) r, 
..MB(i,c,w) + 4>]. The tamyen-conditional in (Sc) is awkward because it violates the 
definedness condition in (24), i.e., the context set c already includes the worlds in which the 
antecedent is true and thus c plus the worlds ofthe antecedent equals c. 
The counterfactual conditional in (9) has an empty modal base and a totally realistic 
ordering source. 
(9) (in a context where the speaker knows that Mary did not come yesterday) 
r-umyen l 
Mary-ka ecey oass ~ ~ te caymi-ka issessultheyntey. 
l-tamyen J 
Mary-NOM yesterday came-COND more fun-NOM exist 
'lfMary had come yesterday, (we) would have had more fun.' 
The valueof ..MB(i,c,w) is a set of all possible worlds. The value of[(rev.(c) r, ..MB(i,c,w)) 
+ 4>] is all possible worlds minus the worlds in which the antecedent Mary-ka ecey oass ('Mary 
had come yesterday') is not true. This set of worlds is further narrowed down by the totally 
realistic ordering source. The worlds are ordered with respect to their being more or less near 
to what is actually the case in the world under consideration. Thus, the value of 
CCoS(,~wi[(rev.(c) r, ..MB(i,c,w)) + 4>] is the closest world(s) to the ideal world (what is 
known to be the case in w) in which the antecedent is true. (9) is true only when the 
consequent te caymi-ka issessultheyntey ('we would have had more fun') is true in the 
world(s) ofCCoS(,~w>[(rev+(c) r, ..MB(i,c,w)) + H 
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In this section, it has been shown that the hybrid theory of Kratzer (1980) and Heim 
(1992) can account for the truth condition and the presuppositional satisfactions of Korean 
(ta)myen-conditionals. In the next section, I will show how this theory can account for the 
difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals in English. 
3,3 Presuppositional constraint on English conditionals 
According to Karttunen and Peters (1979), an indicative conditional is used only when it is 
conventionally implicated that the antecedent is epistemically possible, whereas a 
counterfactual conditional is used only when it is conventionally implicated that the negation of 
the antecedent is epistemically possible. We can incorporate their observations into our 
approach. On our approach, the difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals 
in English can also be accounted for by different presuppositional constraints on them, as done 
for Korean tamyen-conditionals. We can define the CCP of English conditionals as in (28), 
under the assumption that the context set is the .same as the epistemic conversational 
background.8 
(28) CCP for English conditionals 
[(c + (if<liindic,lj/)) is defined iff c +<Ii'#. 0, and 
(c + (if<!isubjunc,11/)) is defined iff c +-,j> '#. 0] 
Where defined, 
[c + if4',ljl] ={we c: CCiS(,~w>[(revt(c) n nMB(i,c,w)) +<!,] + lj/ = same} 
(28) states that an indicative conditional has a presupposition that the antecedent must 
be compatible with the context, whereas an counterfactual conditional has a presupposition that 
the negation of the antecedent is compatible with the context set. Note that (28) differs from 
the definition of Korean conditionals in (24) only in the definedness condition part which 
specifies the constraint on presuppositional satisfactions. This means the following: the truth 
condition (information updating part) of the conditionals of the two languages is the same, but 
the cross-linguistically or language-internally different kinds of conditionals in those languages 
only have different presuppositional requirements concerning the relationship between the 
antecedent and its context set. 
8The assumption that the context set is the same as an epistemic conversational background 
is compatible with Stalnaker's ( 1979) common ground of a conversation. As already discussed 
in section 3.1, the common ground is a set of propositions which is mutually agreed upon 
among conversationalists. The conversationalists can agree upon only what they believe they 
know, i.e., those propositions which are established as knowledge for a group of people or a 
community. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, the syntax and semantics of Korean (ta)myen-conditionals were discussed. The 
syntactic structure of Korean conditionals was analyzed based on the GPSG framework. To 
account for the semantic contribution of the bound morpheme (ta)myen, a new semantically 
potent feature COND was introduced. Also semantic differences and similarities were explored 
among the several varieties of myen-conditionals, such as tamyen-, tako hamyen-, tako 
hantamyen-conditionals. It was shown that how the truth conditions and presupposition 
conditions of factual, hypothetical, and counterfactual (ta)myen-conditionals are determined in 
a hybrid theory ofKratzer's (1980) modal base/ordering source semantics and Heim's (1992) 
context change semantics. Also it was shown how this approach can be extended to the 
account ofEnglish indicative and counterfactual conditionals. 
Finally, a problem will be pointed out that needs further study. It is not clear why ta in 
tamyen, which is usually analyzed as a declarative sentence ending marker, triggers the 
presupposition that the worlds ofthe proposition denoted by the antecedent cannot be a part of 
the worlds of the context set. We may say the similarity between tamyen and tako hamyen is 
responsible for this presupposition trigger, but there does not seem to be any principled reason 
for this. That is, if we assume that tamyen is a reduced form of tako hamyen by -ko ha­
deletion (as claimed in Bak (1987)), then we may explain why ta in tamyen triggers the 
presupposition. However, a problem for this analysis is that there is no principled reason why 
tako hamyen cannot be reduced to myen, rather than tamyen, because a tako hamyen­
conditional seems also to be an instance of a myen-conditional, as shown in section 2. 
Acknowledgements 
My special thanks go to Craige Roberts. This paper could not be completed without her helpful 
corrections, discussions and comments. I also thank Andreas Kathol and Jae-Hak Yoon for 
their comments. Ofcourse, all errors are mine. 
References 
Bak, Sung-Yun. 1987. Conditionals in Korean. Harvard Studies in Korean Linguistics II, ed. 
by S. Kuno et al. Seoul: Hanshin. 
Gazdar, Gerald, Ewan Klein, Geoffrey Pullum and Ivan Sag. 1985. Generalized Phrase 
Structure Grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Heim, Irene. I992. Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs. Journal 
of Semantics 9. 183-221. 
Karttunen, Lauri and Stanley Peters. 1979. Conventional implicature. Syntax and Semantics 
11: Presuppositions, 1-56. New York: Academic Press. 
Kratzer, Angelika. 1980. The notional category ofmodality. Words, Worlds and Contexts, ed. 
by H. J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser, 38-74. Berlin: deGruyter. 
42 CHAN CHUNG 
__ .1989. An investigation ofthe lumps ofthought. Linguistics and Philosophy 12, 607­
653. 
Lewis, David. 1981. Counterfactuals and comparative possibility. Ifs, ed. by W. L. Harper et al. 
57-85. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Roberts, Craige. 1994. .[(and when: the semantics ofconditional and temporal subordinating 
conjunctions. Ms. Ohio State University. 
Stalnaker, Robert (1979) Assertion. Syntax and Semantics 9, ed. by Peter Cole, New York: 
Academic Press. 
_·_. 1981. A theory of conditionals. Ifs, ed. by W. L. Harper et al., 41-55. Dordrecht: 
Reidel. 
